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REGENTS PROFESSOR OF THE 
UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF MARYLAND 
M.N.S. Sellers 
On October 9,2003, Professor Mortimer Newlin Stead Sellers deliv-
ered his first public lecture as Regents Professor of the University Sys-
tem of Maryland (USM). His discourse on The Value and Purpose of 
Law took place at the University of Baltimore School of Law, in the 
presence of the USM Chancellor, the Regents and the faculty and stu-
dents of the University of Baltimore School of Law. 
The Regents' Professorship was established to recognize one or 
more faculty members whose record of scholarly achievement war-
rants appointment to this highest rank in the University System. Ap-
pointment to a Regents' Professorship is made by the chancellor upon 
recommendation by one or more of the presidents of the University 
System of Maryland institutions. Criteria for appointment include na-
tional or international recognition for achievement in the arts, sci-
ences, or the professions. 
THE VALUE AND PURPOSE OF LAW 
M.N.S. Sellers 
OCTOBER 9, 2003 
Thank you for that kind introduction and thank you very much for 
the invitation to give my first Regents Lecture here, at the University 
of Baltimore. 
I would like to thank the Regents of the University System of Mary-
land for the honor that they have done me by linking my name with 
theirs. Or I suppose that I should say, because many Regents are here 
tonight, thank you Maryland Regents for linking my name with yours. 
I am proud to bask in your reflected glory. 
I am also proud and grateful to have been a teacher at the Univer-
sity of Baltimore for fourteen years, and very grateful to the colleagues 
who have encouraged my research, and particularly to Mebane Tur-
ner, Ronald Legon, Gilbert Holmes, Eric Schneider and Michael Mey-
erson, who suggested and supported my selection as a Regents 
professor, and to University of Baltimore President Robert Bogomolny 
and University System of Maryland Chancellor William Kirwan who 
invited you all here tonight. Thank you. 
The two persons that I have worked with most closely over the last 
fourteen years have been Donna Frank and Joyce Bauguess. They 
have played an enormous role in all of my scholarship and because 
this talk is being filmed, I will say to Joyce, who is in the hospital. 
Thank you. 
Finally, and above all, I think that this is a good moment publicly to 
thank my wife, Frances Stead Sellers, and my daughter, Cora Stead 
Sellers, who have tolerated and even encouraged my academic 
interests. 
Greater love hath no woman than to share her house with three 
thousand books. 
Which brings me to the topic of today's lecture, The Value and Pur-
pose of Law, because the value of law is its service to justice; the value of 
justice is its service to society; and the value of society is its service to 
human nature, which is to say, in large part, to human affection, or 
love-the most important and most useful of the human emotions. 
So love is, in this sense, the ultimate basis of law, justice, society, and 
peace. 
Now, that is a series of very bold and unsubstantiated assertions, and 
it is one of the beauties of the nature of twenty-five minute lectures 
that they must always consist of a series of bold assertions, which the 
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constraints of time liberate from ever having to be substantiated. But I 
shall try to elaborate a little bit on what I have just said. 
The basis of law is justice because the essential and fundamental 
purpose of law is to realize justice, and it is the central and necessary 
claim of every legal system that it does so. lt is the nature of law that it 
claims to realize justice and the proper purpose of law is to do so. Law 
has value only to the extent that law serves justice and law has no value 
when it does not. 
This will be the central point that I hope to make in this lecture, 
which purports to discuss the "value" and the "purpose" of law. The 
purpose of law is to realize justice, and law only has value to the extent 
that law does so. 
lt is the essential nature of legal systems that they claim to be just. 
Systems that do not claim to be just are not systems of law. To this I 
might add what really are secondary claims in the context of today's 
discussion: that justice itself is that set of rules which make it possible 
for members of a society to live full and worthwhile lives; and, that 
society is that community of human welfare to which all human beings 
are drawn by their human capacity for love or affection. Human be-
ings are drawn to construct societies by their desire to associate with 
other human beings, because human nature finds its deepest 
pleasures in human interactions with other living creatures. 
So the ultimate basis of law is love, in the sense that law exists for the 
maintenance of human society, but the more immediate purpose of 
law is justice, and that will be the focus of my remarks today. 
Now, I don't suppose that this last statement will seem particularly 
controversial to those of you who are not lawyers. Law ought to be 
just, because society ought to be just. People ought to care about the 
law, and to respect the law, when the law is systematically just, but not 
when the law is systematically unjust. Governments claim that people 
ought to obey their laws and, therefore, must also claim that their laws 
are just. 
Governments claim in their public pronouncements to "establish 
justice" through law. This claim is made by the United States Consti-
tution. All governments make this claim whether or not their laws 
actually establish justice. Governments always make this claim 
whether or not their laws actually establish just institutions. The claim 
will always be made that the existing legal system is just, whether or 
not it is just, in fact. 
This helps to explain why lawyers and even philosophers have so 
seldom in the past formulated their definitions and descriptions of 
law in terms of the law's claim to justice. Lawyers and philosophers in 
the past have not very often formulated their definitions and descrip-
tions of law in terms of the law's claim to justice, because the law is 
not, in fact, always just. 
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It is possible to say that such-and-such a rule is the law in such-and-
such a jurisdiction, but that it is, in fact, ur~ust. So, for example, 
H.L.A. Hart, when he was professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford Uni-
versity, insisted on the separation of law and morals.} He wanted to 
make a firm distinction between what the law is, and what the law 
ought to be.2 Bad laws should be disobeyed, perhaps, but that does 
not mean that they are not laws, Hart said, it just means that they do 
not deserve our respect and obedience.3 This is far from being a 
novel view. 
John Austin, the very influential English legal theorist of the early 
nineteenth century, strongly promoted the view that "[t]he existence 
of law is one thing, its merit or demerit another."4 Austin described 
law as commands,5 by which he meant significations of desire. He 
believed that all laws were significations of desire, coupled with the 
purpose of inflicting an evil or pain if the desire should be disre-
garded.6 For legal positivists such as Austin, laws are commands that 
oblige generally to acts or forbearances of a class.7 Laws are com-
mands issued by a determinate rational being to those subordinate to 
him.8 This way of looking at things makes it very easy to separate law 
from morality. Law, according to Austin's theory, is whatever the sov-
ereign in any given state says that it is. 
The trouble with looking at law in this way is that it misses the role 
of judges and other enforcers of the law. Respect for the law, but even 
more than that, respect for judges, has always been a particularly 
prominent feature of American culture, so it should not be surprising 
that it was an American, John Chipman Gray, who very quickly no-
ticed Austin's weakness in this respect, and reformulated Austin's defi-
nition of law. 
Gray claimed that the law of the state is composed of those rules 
which the courts, which is to say, the judicial organs of the state, "lay 
down for the determination of rights and duties."9 
In other words, for Gray, the law is not what the legislature or sover-
eign says that it is, but what the courts say that it is. 
Gray's near contemporary, the famous cynic and United States Su-
preme Court justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes, went one step further. 
1. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Marals, in ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, 49 (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1983). 
2. [d. at 71. 
3. [d. at 75. 
4. [d. at 52. 
5. JOHN AUSTIN, Lecture I, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, lO-
II (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. ed. 1999) (1832). 
6. [d. at 21. 
7. [d. at 29. 
8. [d. at 118. 
9. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw, 82 (Columbia 
Univ. Press, 1909). 
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Speaking to a group of idealistic young law students, in a forum much 
like this one, at the dedication of a new law building at Boston Univer-
sity. Speaking to sweet young law students in all the nastiness of his 
embittered old age, Holmes said that law is not even what the judges 
themselves say that it is. Instead, law is what judges actually do in de-
ciding cases. "Law," for Holmes, was "a set of prophecies of what the 
courts will do in fact."lo Holmes insisted that "the object of our 
study"-he meant the study of law-the object of our study should be 
"the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the in-
strumentality of the courts."ll 
Now, John Chipman Gray was largely right about what gets taught 
in law schools. An awful lot of time in law schools is spent on studying 
what judges have said in the past about what the law is in particular 
cases. And Oliver Wendell Holmes was right about what many lawyers 
spend much of their time doing. Many lawyers spend much of their 
time predicting what courts will actually punish their clients for hav-
ing done. Holmes called this the "bad man" theory of law. Holmes 
looked at law from the perspective of the bad man, who cares only 
about what he will be made to suffer for. Lots of lawyers, and their 
clients, are "bad men" in the sense that Holmes approved of. 
But that is not the purpose of law. 
It is not what makes law valuable. 
And although it is also at some level true, it does not reach the es-
sential attribute of law, which is its claim to be just. 
The examples that I have given so far illustrate three common falla-
cies about law: the positivist fallacy of law; the interpretivist fallacy of law; 
and the realist fallacy of law. 
Positivists, such as Austin, think that the content of law can be deter-
mined by looking at the determinate intent of determinate legislators. 
They think that law is some particular person's determinable expres-
sion of how things ought to be done. 
But the positivist fallacy is mistaken, because those who promulgate 
their will as law also claim that law ought to be obeyed. In other 
words, they claim that their will is just, as expressed through law. They 
claim that their will is just and, in staking a claim to justice, they must 
enlist the interpretive power of judges and other public officials. Law 
is not only what they say it is, but is also supposedly just; and this claim 
of justice colors the interpretation and application of supposedly posi-
tive legal norms. 
Seeing this to be true, one might fall into the interpretivist fallacy of 
law, which is to believe that the law emerges and becomes determinate 
10. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 
(1897). 
11. Id. 
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only through the application by judges and others of positive sources 
of law (such as legislation) to actual cases and controversies. 
But interpretivists also go too far on the strength of their one im-
portant insight, because judges and the police can still be mistaken. 
When legislators or a constitution charge judges or the police with a 
certain amount of discretion, by using moral words such as "liberty" or 
"reasonable" in statutes, for example, judges may still interpret these 
statutes wrongly, or corruptly. Not all interpretations are correct, or 
even prima facie acceptable. Some interpretations of the law can be 
seen to be wrong, even when they are made by courts, and enforced 
by the state. 
The realist might say that even if some judicial decisions are wrong, 
wrong decisions are law, if they are enforced. But here too realists will 
get into trouble, because in order to predict what courts will do, and 
which decisions the state will enforce, lawyers will have to take into 
account the formal sources and the moral pretensions of law. Law 
may be (at some level) whatever the courts will do, but what courts will 
do depends on the legal system that they belong to, and judges in all 
legal systems will be directed in part by their system's claim of 
legitimacy. 
Judges and other officers of the law will be guided by the moral 
directives of their legal system's claim to be just. 
Which brings me to the final fallacy about law that I want to criticize 
today, and then I will finish by returning to my own-let us call this 
the "correct"-view about the value and purpose of law. 
The final fallacy that I want to identify this evening is the naturalist 
fallacy of law, which identifies the law with justice. The naturalist fal-
lacy assumes that everything which ought to be law is the law in fact. I 
have never actually met anybody who really believed this. But I think 
that it is worth bringing up the naturalist fallacy to distinguish it from 
what I am saying myself. 
The naturalist fallacy assumes that everything which ought to be the 
law, is the law in fact. 
What I am saying, in company, I think, with every legal system that 
the world has ever known, is not that what ought to be the law is al-
ready the law, without any mediation by the legal system itself. The 
concept of law that I am articulating here begins with the universal 
and, indeed, the tautologous position that what ought to be the law, 
ought to be the law. I am saying that the value and purpose of all legal 
systems is to make what ought to be the law, the law in fact. 
Laws only exist in the context of the legal systems that create them, 
and all legal systems claim to be just. All legal systems claim the virtue 
of maintaining a process through which what ought to be the law be-
comes the law in fact. It is on the basis of this assertion of moral cor-
rectness that legal systems make the further claim that their subjects 
ought to obey them. And indeed it is true that the subjects of a legal 
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system would have a duty to obey its laws in most circumstances, if it 
were in fact also true that the legal system answered questions of what 
ought to be the law, better than its subjects would by using some other 
system. 
The value of all legal systems is epistemic, if they have any value at all. 
Legal systems properly exist for the purpose of giving right answers 
about justice. 
This observation has two important implications: first, the less effec-
tive a legal system is in doing this-which is to say, the less effective 
that a legal system is in giving right answers about justice-the less 
attention or obedience that legal system deserves; and second, in or-
der to capture attention and obedience, legal systems will try to appear 
to be just, or even actually try to be just in some aspects of their rule, 
and this will have an influence on judges, the police, and other of-
ficers of the law. 
So all legal systems contain a certain amount of moral language, 
which requires interpretation and opens a gap between the law itself 
and the original intentions or understandings of the persons who 
framed it. 
If the value and purpose oflaw lies in the realization of justice, then 
the legitimacy of all legal systems will depend on their actual ability to 
realize justice, in fact. 
The legitimacy of all legal systems depends upon their actual ability 
to realize justice in a particular society, and this separates the study of 
justice from the study of law. 
Justice derives, as I have asserted, from the rules that should govern 
a human society, so that all its members can live worthwhile and fulfil-
ling lives. 
Law begins somewhat differently with the political institutions that 
discover and implement these rules of justice best. What such institu-
tions discover and implement is the law, even when it is not fully just. 
One may have, and in fact I do have, quite an elaborate theory of 
justice-and I have hinted already this evening about what my theory 
of justice is-but the more important question for the actual imple-
mentation of justice, which is to say for law, is how to adjudicate be-
tween my particular conception of justice and somebody else's. 
Law is a theory of practical justice, and a legal system is a process for 
discovering and implementing the rules that justice requires. 
Lawyers and others should look at the law in this way for two rea-
sons: first, because it is in fact the way that most people do look at the 
law, as a system that ought to implement justice. All legal systems 
claim to do so; and second, because the less effective any legal system is 
in realizing justice, the less it deserves anyone's attention or 
obedience. 
The purpose of law is to realize justice. 
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Law's value depends upon doing so well. 
Our duty as lawyers, law professors, judges and citizens is to mea-
sure the law against the purpose for which law exists, and to strive to 
help the law to serve this purpose better. 
